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Once Unified: The Supreme Court Split
On Affirmative Action
By CATHERINE CRIDER*
I, [Sonia Sotomayor], am a Puerto Rican born and raised in
the South Bronx from what is traditionally described as a socio-
economically poor background. . . .
I was accepted rather readily at Princeton and equally as fast
at Yale. But my test scores were not comparable to that of my
classmates . . . .1
THIS STATEMENT would have been unthinkable at one point in
the history of the United States, and it certainly would have never
come from the mouth of a Supreme Court Justice. With education
viewed as a privilege, reserved only for the white elite for a large part
of the country’s early history,2 the failure to provide equal education
to all has now become a source of shame.3 The United States, how-
ever, has evolved since its colonial times and the idea of affirmative
action has changed the American education system. Affirmative action
was introduced over fifty years ago in large part to repair the damage
of the past. Controversial since its inception, affirmative action contin-
* Ms. Crider is a J.D. candidate at the University of San Francisco. She holds a B.S.
in Elementary Education from Boston University and a M.Ed in Curriculum and
Instruction from Boston College.
1. ANTONIA FELIX, SONIA SOTOMAYOR: THE TRUE AMERICAN DREAM 39 (2010) (quot-
ing Justice Sotomayor’s remarks at a Practising Law Institute panel discussion in the early
1990s); see also Practising Law Institute Panelist, N.Y. TIMES 42:30 (June 10, 2009), http://
www.nytimes.com/video/us/politics/1194840834851/practicing-law-institute-panelist
.html.
2. See Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 489–90 (1954) (discussing rudi-
mentary public school system in northern schools and lack of public school system in the
South).
3. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 316 (2003) (discussing law school’s commit-
ment to “racial and ethnic diversity with special reference to the inclusion of students from
groups which have been historically discriminated against, like African-Americans, Hispan-
ics and Native Americans”).
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ues to be an issue before the Supreme Court as individuals seek to
further understand its meaning and question its necessity.4
Affirmative action was first mentioned in March 1961 by Execu-
tive Order 10925,5 which mandated “affirmative action to ensure that
applicants are employed, and that employees are treated during em-
ployment, without regard to their race, creed, color, or national ori-
gin.”6 This Order was followed four years later by Executive Order
11246,7 which implemented affirmative action in government con-
tracts.8 The responsibility to clarify what exactly the U.S. Constitution
allows in regards to affirmative action has since fallen on the judicial
branch. Numerous court cases have come before the Court with law-
yers arguing that affirmative action has resulted in violation of their
clients’ Fourteenth Amendment rights.9
Although the Court’s opinion in Brown v. Board of Education10 was
a unanimous one, the Court has since become divided on the issue of
affirmative action. Evidence of this division comes in the numerous
multipart—concurring and dissenting—opinions. Since Brown, jus-
tices have signed onto numerous lengthy opinions while also writing
their own separate concurring and dissenting opinions.11 With the
most recent case of Fisher v. University of Texas,12 Americans were hop-
ing for an answer about the future of affirmative action,13 which a
divided Court ultimately failed to provide. Such a failure does not
come as a surprise, however, when one looks at the previous decisions
involving affirmative action and sees how time has only widened the
divide in the Court over this issue.
In an effort to better understand the Supreme Court split over
affirmative action, this Comment will examine the pivotal education-
4. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); Grutter v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003); Fisher v. Univ. of
Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013).
5. 3 C.F.R. 448 (1959–1963).
6. Exec. Order No. 10925, 3 C.F.R. 448, 450 (1959–1963).
7. 3 C.F.R. 339 (1964–1965).
8. Exec. Order No. 11246, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1964–1965).
9. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); Grutter v. Bollinger,
539 U.S. 306 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003); Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at
Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013).
10. 347 U.S. 483, 486 (1954).
11. See infra text accompanying notes 36–41 (Bakke), 52–59 (Grutter), 70–75 (Gratz), R
and 81–86 (Parents Involved). R
12. 133 S. Ct. 2411.
13. See Lyle Denniston, Argument Preview: Is Affirmative Action About to End?, SCOTUS-
BLOG (Oct. 9, 2012, 12:02 AM) (asking whether the Court will “declare an end, constitu-
tionally, to ‘affirmative action’ as a public policy”).
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related affirmative action cases from the last fifty years. First, examin-
ing Brown sets an important backdrop for later affirmative action
cases. Next, looking at the cases prior to Fisher in chronological order
shows how splits in the Court began and continue to grow. Finally,
examining the opinions in the most recent education affirmative ac-
tion case before the Court, Fisher, reveals that the split clearly is still
alive and well.
I. The Backdrop: Brown v. Board of Education
Although Brown was decided prior to Executive Order 10925 and
therefore predates affirmative action, it demonstrates a critical shift in
the thinking of the U.S. Supreme Court in regards to race relations
and education. In many ways, it represents the last time the Court was
unified in their opinion of race and education. A consolidated opin-
ion, Brown decided four different cases brought from Kansas, South
Carolina, Virginia, and Delaware.14 The consolidated cases included
different specific facts, but in each case, “minors of the Negro race . . .
[sought] the aid of the courts in obtaining admission to the public
schools of their community on a nonsegregated basis.”15 All of the
minors in question were denied admission to schools attended by
white children under state school segregation laws.16 In every case,
except the Delaware case,17 the federal district court denied relief for
the plaintiffs based on the “separate but equal” doctrine announced
by the Supreme Court in Plessy v. Ferguson.18
A unanimous decision of Chief Justice Warren and Justices Black,
Reed, Frankfurter, Douglas, Jackson, Burton, Clark, and Minton,
Brown begins with a discussion of the Court’s investigation into the
Fourteenth Amendment’s intended effect on public education, and
its ultimate finding that, “[w]hat others in Congress and the state leg-
islatures had in mind cannot be determined with any degree of cer-
tainty.”19 In writing the opinion of the Court, Chief Justice Warren
discussed in considerable space the status of public education and its
evolution since the passing of the Fourteenth Amendment.20 He also
14. Brown, 347 U.S. at 486.
15. Id. at 487.
16. Id. at 487–88.
17. In the Delaware case, the “separate but equal” doctrine was still upheld; however,
the court found that the plaintiffs must be allowed admission to the white schools because
of the white school’s superior nature. Gebhart v. Belton, 91 A.2d 137 (Del. 1952).
18. 163 U.S. 537 (1896); Brown, 347 U.S. at 488.
19. Brown, 347 U.S. at 489.
20. Id. at 490–92.
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noted lower court findings that “the Negro and white schools involved
have been equalized, or are being equalized, with respect to buildings,
curricula, qualifications and salaries of teachers, and other ‘tangible’
factors.”21 As a result of uncertainty about the legislative intent of the
Fourteenth Amendment in regards to public education and a lack of
difference in tangible factors, the Court explicitly stated its decision
could only be based upon “the effect of segregation itself on public
education.”22
When determining the effect of segregation, the Court first ad-
dressed whether equality in education was even necessary and looked
at “public education in the light of its full development and its present
place in American life.”23 Considering the amount spent on educa-
tion, the role education played in preserving cultural values / teach-
ing civic responsibility, and its necessity for professional training, the
Court found that the state had undertaken to provide an essential op-
portunity, which the state must make available equally to all.24 Next,
the Court addressed whether segregation alone deprived minority
children of equal educational opportunities.25 Chief Justice Warren
left no doubt about the Court’s findings on this issue, explaining, “To
separate them from others of similar age and qualifications solely be-
cause of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in
the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way un-
likely ever to be undone.”26
The Brown decision explicitly overturned the Court’s previous rul-
ing in Plessy27 and eliminated the “separate but equal” doctrine in
public education.28 The Court in Brown went so far as to find that
separate educational facilities were inherently unequal and segrega-
tion was a denial of equal protection under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.29 This decision and the Court’s findings on the importance of
education and diversity for all provided an important foundation for
the affirmative action cases to come. By presenting a unified opinion,
the Court left no question as to its views on segregation. Recognizing
the culture of the time and the necessity of a unanimous opinion in
21. Id. at 492.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 493.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 494.
27. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
28. Brown, 347 U.S. at 494–95.
29. Id. at 495.
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Brown, Chief Justice Warren worked tirelessly to unify the Court.30
Sadly, this harmonious spirit would not continue in future affirmative
education cases.
II. A History of Fifty Years of Division in Affirmative Action
Cases
Following the creation of affirmative action through Executive
Order 10925,31 the Court’s decision in Brown was turned on its head;
the Court was faced with addressing the constitutionality of preference
being given to minority students. Ethnic majority students rejected
from institutions of higher learning came before the Court to argue
that various admission systems supporting affirmative action infringed
upon their Fourteenth Amendment rights.
A. Regents of the University of California v. Bakke
The first of the education affirmative action cases to reach the
Court was Regents of the University of California v. Bakke.32 Involving med-
ical school admissions at the University of California, Davis, the key
question for the Court in Bakke was the constitutionality of an admis-
sions system that required “the admission of a specific number of stu-
dents from certain minority groups.”33 The program in question
“consisted of a separate admissions system operating in coordination
with the regular admissions process.”34 Candidates under the separate
admissions system were reviewed by a separate committee and were
not required to have the minimum 2.5 grade point average that was
mandatory in the regular admissions process.35
In contrast to the unanimity of Brown, Justice Powell announced
the Court’s fragmented judgment and a multi-part plurality opinion.36
Justice White joined in Parts I, III-A, and V-C.37 Justices Brennan, Mar-
shall, and Blackmun also joined in Parts I and V-C.38 Justices Brennan,
White, Marshall, and Blackmun filed an additional opinion concur-
30. See Stephen Ellmann, The Rule of Law and the Achievement of Unanimity in Brown, 49
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 741, 761–64 (2004–2005) (discussing Chief Justice Warren’s efforts and
attempts to persuade the Court, especially Justice Reed, to avoid a split decision).
31. Exec. Order No. 10925, 3 C.F.R. 448 (1959–1963).
32. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
33. Id. at 269–70.
34. Id. at 272–73.
35. Id. at 274–75.
36. Id. at 269.
37. Id. at 272 n.‡.
38. Id.
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ring in part and dissenting in part.39 In addition, Justices White, Mar-
shall, and Blackmun each filed separate opinions.40 Justice Stevens
filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part in which
Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart and Rehnquist joined.41 The
result of all of these opinions was two different plurality decisions that
agreed with parts of Justice Powell’s opinion, but not the same part.
Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun felt that race
could be used constitutionally as a factor when it was for the purpose
of remedying substantial chronic underrepresentation of certain mi-
norities;42 however, Justice Powell’s controlling opinion found that
the use of explicit racial classification violated the individual rights
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.43 Because race is an in-
herently suspect distinction, plaintiff Allan Bakke was entitled to a
showing that the classification was necessary to promote a substantial
state interest under the majority opinion.44 While race as a classifica-
tion was not necessary for the university to meet its goals as outlined,
the controlling opinion did note that competitive consideration of
race could be considered a substantial interest.45 Justice Powell’s deci-
sion left open the option of race-conscious admission programs in the
future.46 Race could be deemed a “plus,” but it could not insulate the
applicant from comparison with all other candidates.47 This first deci-
sion on affirmative action left the Court split almost exactly in half
and left many questions in regards to what was an acceptable plus.
B. Grutter v. Bollinger
Next in the line of education affirmative action cases was Grutter
v. Bollinger.48 In Grutter, a law school applicant at the University of
Michigan sued the university after being denied admission.49 The law
school admissions program in question focused on academic ability;
however, it also included an assessment of “applicants’ talents, exper-
iences, and potential.”50 While it did not define diversity solely in
39. Id. at 324.
40. Id. at 379–408.
41. Id. at 408.
42. Id. at 369.
43. See id. at 320.
44. Id. at 305.
45. Id. at 320.
46. Id. at 326.
47. Id. at 317–18.
48. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
49. Id. at 316.
50. Id. at 315–16.
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terms of race, the plaintiff argued, it did consider factors that
predominantly affected diversity.51
Justice O’Connor delivered the opinion of the highly divided
Court, in which Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined in full.52
Justice Ginsburg filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Breyer
also joined.53 Justice Thomas joined with Justice Scalia in an opinion
written by Justice Scalia concurring in part and dissenting in part.54
Justice Thomas also wrote his own opinion concurring in part and
dissenting in part.55 Justice Scalia joined in Justice Thomas’ opinion as
to Parts I–VII.56 Justices Scalia and Thomas joined the majority opin-
ion to the extent that it was consistent with the views expressed in Part
VII of Justice Thomas’ opinion.57 Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and
Thomas joined in the dissenting opinion filed by Chief Justice Rehn-
quist.58 Justice Kennedy also filed a dissenting opinion in the case.59
O’Connor’s 5-4 majority opinion found a compelling interest in
promoting class diversity.60 It also held that a “race-conscious admis-
sions process” did not amount to an unconstitutional quota system
under Bakke and that such a process may favor “underrepresented mi-
nority groups” so long as other factors are analyzed on an individual
basis for every applicant.61 Justices Ginsburg and Breyer concurred in
the judgment of the Court but wrote separately against O’Connor’s
belief that affirmative action measures would be unnecessary in
twenty-five years.62
Written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the main dissent in the case
argued that the University of Michigan’s plus system was just a thinly
veiled, unconstitutional quota system.63 Justice Kennedy joined in this
opinion and argued in a separate dissent that the Court failed to apply
strict scrutiny as required in Bakke.64 These and the other dissents in
the case showed very clearly that although the majority had managed
51. Id. at 317.
52. Id. at 310.
53. Id. at 344.
54. Id. at 346.
55. Id. at 349.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 310.
58. Id. at 378.
59. Id. at 387.
60. Id. at 332–33.
61. Id. at 335–36.
62. Id. at 344–46.
63. Id. at 370–80.
64. Id. at 387.
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to find one additional vote since the 50/50 split of Bakke, the Court
was still split on key issues such as what constituted a quota system and
the application of strict scrutiny to affirmative action.
C. Gratz v. Bollinger
Heard by the Court on the same day as Grutter, Gratz v. Bollinger65
was another case questioning the affirmative action policy at the Uni-
versity of Michigan.66 While Grutter examined the university’s law
school admission process, Gratz focused on the university’s undergrad-
uate admission program.67 Gratz examined the University of Michi-
gan’s undergraduate admissions policy, which used a point system
that automatically granted twenty points to applicants from under-
represented minority groups.68 Brought by petitioners Jennifer Gratz
and Patrick Hamacher, Caucasian residents of the State of Michigan
who had both applied for admission to the University of Michigan’s
College of Literature, Science, and the Arts. Both were rejected and
they filed a class action suit that alleged racial discrimination in viola-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment.69
Gratz resulted in a deeply divided opinion of the Court. Chief
Justice Rehnquist delivered the majority opinion, in which Justices
O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas joined.70 Justice O’Connor
also filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Breyer joined in
part.71 In addition to Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion, Justice
Thomas and Justice Breyer also filed concurring opinions.72 Justice
Stevens wrote a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Souter joined.73
Justice Souter also filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Gins-
burg joined in Part II.74 Justice Ginsburg wrote her own dissenting
opinion, in which Justice Souter joined and Justice Breyer joined in
Part I.75
The Court’s majority opinion found the admissions policy made
race the decisive factor for virtually every minimally qualified, under-
65. 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 249–50.
68. Id. at 256.
69. Id. at 251–52.
70. Id. at 249.
71. Id. at 276.
72. Id. at 281.
73. Id. at 282.
74. Id. at 291.
75. Id. at 298.
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represented minority applicant.76 As the policy was “not narrowly tai-
lored to achieve [the University’s] asserted compelling interest in
diversity,” the policy violated the Equal Protection Clause, Title VI of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and 42 U.S.C. § 1981.77
Although the 6-3 decision in Gratz was the most unified support
by the Supreme Court Justices for a majority opinion in an education-
related affirmative action case since Brown, a split within the Court was
still clearly evident based on the number of separate decisions that
were written and the combined 5-4 verdict in Grutter.
D. Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District
Number 1
Following the University of Michigan cases, the next affirmative
action case to reach the Supreme Court was Parents Involved in Commu-
nity Schools v. Seattle School District Number 1,78 which was heard together
with Meredith v. Jefferson County Board of Education.79 Both school dis-
tricts had adopted plans that largely considered race in placing chil-
dren into district schools to ensure that schools were racially
balanced.80
Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court.81 Jus-
tices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito joined in Parts I, II, III-A,
and III-C.82 Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito joined in Parts II-B and
IV.83 Additionally, Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion, and Jus-
tice Kennedy filled an opinion concurring in part.84 Justice Stevens
filed a dissenting opinion.85 Justice Breyer filed a dissenting opinion,
in which Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg joined.86
Once again returning to a true split decision (4-1-4), Justice Ken-
nedy played toward both four-justice opinions in Parents Involved. Be-
cause Justice Kennedy sided with Chief Justice Roberts and Justices
Scalia, Thomas, and Alito in limited respect, the majority opinion
held that although the districts did not operate legally segregated
76. Id. at 272.
77. Id. at 275.
78. 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
79. 547 U.S. 1178 (2006).
80. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 709–10.
81. Id. at 708.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 708–09.
84. Id. at 748, 782.
85. Id. at 798.
86. Id. at 803.
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schools, students were still denied equal protection because the
school assignments largely relied on race.87 The school districts failed
to establish racial diversity as merely one type of desirable diversity
because their plans used a white/nonwhite binary as the determining
factor in student placement in district schools.88 Racial imbalance in
the schools alone was not unconstitutional, and the minimal effect the
classifications actually had on school assignments indicated that other
means could effectively achieve the school districts’ goals.89
Justice Kennedy, as a true swing vote, also sided with Justices
Breyer, Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg, to include in the majority hold-
ing that “compelling interest[s] exist[ ] in avoiding racial isolation”
and promoting diversity.90 Although the need for these compelling
interests was not present in Parents Involved for the reasons previously
mentioned, Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion clearly stated, “[a]
compelling interest exists in avoiding racial isolation, an interest that
a school district, in its discretion and expertise, may choose to pur-
sue.”91 However, this compelling interest did not mean it was permissi-
ble to “classify every student on the basis of race and to assign each of
them to schools based on that classification.”92
The Parents Involved decision truly showed how split the Supreme
Court was over affirmative action. Two separate camps had clearly
emerged by this point with a swing vote in Justice Kennedy. Such a
divided Court invited future grants of certiorari on affirmative action
after Parents Involved, and another case involving admissions at the
University of Texas at Austin came just six years later.
III. The Road to the Future: Fisher v. University of Texas at
Austin
In Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, the most recent Supreme
Court case involving affirmative action, an applicant denied admission
to the University of Texas sued the university because of the way it
considered race in determining the incoming class.93 Basing their de-
cisions largely on the Supreme Court’s holdings in Grutter and Gratz,
87. Id. at 702–03.
88. Id. at 723.
89. Id. at 733.
90. Id. at 797–98.
91. Id. at 797.
92. Id. at 798.
93. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin,133 S. Ct. 2411, 2415 (2013).
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the district court and the Fifth Circuit gave substantial deference to
the compelling interest of diversity and found for the university.94
Joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Thomas,
Breyer, Alito, and Sotomayor, Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion
of the Court.95 In addition to the majority opinion, Justices Scalia and
Thomas filed separate concurring opinions.96 Justice Ginsburg filed a
dissenting opinion.97 Justice Kagan took no part in the consideration
or decision of the case due to her previous involvement in the case as
Solicitor General.98
The Court found that the Fifth Circuit did not hold the university
to the demanding burden of strict scrutiny previously laid out in Bakke
and Grutter.99 Citing back to Justice Powell’s principal opinion in the
Bakke case, the majority opinion in Fisher noted the benefits that flow
from a diverse student body are complex and encompass a broad ar-
ray “of qualifications and characteristics of which racial or ethnic ori-
gin is but a single though important element.”100
Showing his unwavering position on affirmative action, Justice
Scalia’s concurring opinion was only a paragraph in length.101 In this
paragraph, Justice Scalia maintained the same view that he first ex-
pressed in his concurring opinion in Grutter: “The Constitution pros-
cribes government discrimination on the basis of race, and state-
provided education is no exception.”102 However, since the petitioner
had not asked to overturn the holding in Grutter, Justice Scalia joined
with the majority in full.103 In his own concurring opinion, Justice
Thomas elected to explain that Grutter should be overruled because
the Equal Protection Clause categorically prohibits “a State’s use of
race in higher education admissions decisions.”104
In her lone dissenting opinion, Justice Ginsburg would have af-
firmed the Fifth Circuit’s ruling finding that a proper analysis under
Bakke and Grutter had been done.105 Although Justice Ginsburg was
94. Id. at 2417.
95. Id. at 2414.
96. Id. at 2422.
97. Id. at 2432.
98. Id. at 2411.
99. Id. at 2415.
100. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 315 (1978).
101. Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2422 (Scalia, J., concurring).
102. Id. (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 349 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part)).
103. Id.
104. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
105. Id. at 2432–34.
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the sole dissenter, the complete opposite opinions expressed in Jus-
tice Scalia’s and Justice Thomas’s concurring opinions proves the split
in the Court remains.
Conclusion
Since its creation in Executive Order 10925, affirmative action
has been a source of controversy. As a result of the surrounding de-
bate, the Supreme Court of the United States has addressed the con-
stitutionality of affirmative action multiple times. Although Brown
came down as a unanimous decision, the Court has been very split in
the subsequent decisions dealing with how affirmative action should
appropriately be carried out. The most recent decision in Fisher has
provided little clarity. As a result, it is highly likely that the Supreme
Court will soon decide another case involving affirmative action.106
Although the Court has been hesitant up until this point to eliminate
affirmative action, the decisions of the Court have been inching closer
and closer to such a holding—particularly in the area of higher
education.
If future rulings limit how race consideration can look in admis-
sion systems it will be hard for affirmative action to survive. As univer-
sity admission programs continue to get drawn into lawsuits, leaders
may shy away from policies strongly favoring affirmative action and
consideration of race. At a minimum, they will have to rethink how
they word their admissions policies. With American colleges enrolling
historic proportions of females107 and minority students,108 questions
about the necessity of affirmative action will continue to be raised un-
til the Court provides a more unified, decisive answer on the constitu-
tionality of this issue in today’s society.
106. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative
Action, No. 12-682 (U.S. argued Oct. 15, 2013) (presenting as question “[w]hether a state
violates the Equal Protection Clause by amending its constitution to prohibit race- and sex-
based discrimination or preferential treatment in public-university admissions decisions”).
107. THOMAS D. SNYDER & SALLY A. DILLOW, U.S. DEPT. OF EDUC., NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC.
STATISTICS, DIGEST OF EDUCATION STATISTICS 2012, at 319 (2013), available at http://nces
.ed.gov/pubs2014/2014015.pdf (finding 57.0 percent of students enrolled in degree-grant-
ing institutions receiving Title IV financial aid in fall 2011 identified as female compared to
34.7 percent in fall 1957).
108. Id. at 363 (finding the percentage of students enrolled in degree-granting institu-
tions that receive Title IV financial aid in fall 2011 that identified as other than white was
38.8 percent in 2011 compared to 20.1 percent in fall 1990. The percentage identifying as
black was 15.1 percent in 2011 compared to 9.3 percent in 1990).
